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Abstract  
The objective of the study is to examine the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management 
in Nigeria.  The pooled data design was employed in the study. The study employed the simple random 
sampling technique in selecting a sample size consisting of 10 commercial banks as at 2012. Secondary data 
retrieved from the audited financial statements of the banks for 2006-2010 were used for the study. The method 
of data analysis used was the multivariate regression technique based on the ordinary least squares assumptions. 
A series of diagnostic tests such as the variance inflation factor test, white heteroskedasticity test and the 
Breusch -Godfrey LM correlation test were also employed as diagnostic checks for the result. The ownership 
structure was disaggregated into insider ownership, institutional ownership and external block ownership 
respectively. The finding of the study revealed the existence of a positive and significant relationship between 
External block ownership (EXTBLH) and Earnings Management.  The relationship between Insider Ownership 
(INSIDEROWN) and Earnings Management was also observed to be positive and statistically significant at 5% 
level.  A positive relationship was also observed between Institutional Investors Ownership (INSTIIOWN) and 
Earnings Management However, the relationship is statistically insignificance at 5% level. The recommendation 
is that there is a need to focus on building effective corporate governance to mitigate the proclivity for earnings 
management in the banking sector. 
Key words; Earnings Management, Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, External Block-Holders.  
 
1.0 Introduction  
Earnings management has been at the core of accounting research for the last two and a half decades. However, 
there has been varied conceptualization of earnings management from different researchers. Schipper (1989, p. 
92) defined earnings management as “the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles to bring about a desired level of reported income”. Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
state that "earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports, to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting". 
Earnings management can assume any of the following approaches; (1) via the structuring of certain revenue 
and/or expense transactions; (2) via changes in accounting procedures; and/or (3) via accruals management 
(McNichols and Wilson 1988, and Schipper 1989). Of the above mentioned earnings management techniques, 
accruals management is the most damaging to the usefulness of accounting reports because investors are 
unaware of the extent of such accruals (Mitra and Rodrigue , 2002). Accrual is defined as the difference between 
the earnings and cash flow from operating activities. Accruals can be further classified into non-discretionary 
accruals and discretionary accruals. While non-discretionary accruals are accounting adjustments to the firm’s 
cash flows mandated by the accounting standard-setting bodies, discretionary accruals are adjustments to cash 
flows selected by the managers (Rao and Dandale, 2008). 
The connection between ownership structure and earnings management has been the subject of an important 
and ongoing debate. It is believed that diffuseness of a firm’s ownership structure plausibly serves the firm’s 
shareholders better than would a concentrated ownership structure. There is a public perception that earnings 
management is utilized opportunistically by firm managers for their own private gain rather than for the benefit 
of the stockholders. This misalignment of managers' and shareholders' interest have often be cited as basis for 
suspicion of the occurrence of earnings management as managers could use the flexibility provided by the 
accounting standards to manage income opportunistically, thereby creating distortions in the reported earnings. 
However, a number of academic studies have indicated that there could be gains from management of earnings 
for shareholders as there is the tendency for enhancing the information value of earnings.  
In the Nigerian corporate environment, earnings management is posing a serious threat viz-a-viz, the 
credibility of public financials. There have been several cases of earnings management especially in the banking 
sector and this has raised many questions about the ethical standards of management and about the integrity of 
financial reports issued by professional accountants (Bakre, 2007; Ajibolade, 2008; Okike, 2009). This paper 
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examines the relationship between earnings management and ownership structures in the Nigerian environment 
using data from the banking sector.  
1.1 Statement of research problem  
The effect of ownership structure on earnings management has stimulated research attention. Wang (2006) states 
that ownership structure has important effects on reported earnings. Sanchez-Ballesta and Garsa-Meca (2007) 
examine the relationship between ownership structure and discretionary accruals for a sample of Spanish 
non-financial companies. Their results support the hypothesis that insider ownership contributes to the 
constraining of earnings management when the proportion of shares held by insiders is not too high. When 
insiders own a large percentage of shares, however, they are entrenched and the relation between insider 
ownership, discretionary accruals reverses. Conversely, several other studies (e,g Porter 1992 and Bushee, 1998, 
Grace and Koh. .2005).) allege that frequent trading and fragmented ownership discourage active involvement in 
the earnings management  However, from the preview of prior studies, we identified the following issues. 
Firstly, it appears that there is no general agreement regarding the effect of ownership structure on earnings 
management. Secondly, there is also limited research on the association between ownership structure and 
earnings management as most existing researches, usually study just one aspect of ownership structure and their 
findings tend not to be sufficient for ascertaining the true relationship between ownership structure and earnings 
management. Thirdly, the researcher is unaware of any study in the Nigerian corporate environment that has 
disaggregated ownership structure into insider ownership, institutional ownership and external block ownership 
respectively and examines the relationship with earnings management beyond anecdotal assertion especially in 
the Nigerian Banking sector.  It is in the light of these inadequacies that this study’s contribution provides the 
relevance.   
1.2 Objective of the study  
On the basis of the above research problem, the broad objective of this study is to examine the relationship and 
impact of ownership structure and earnings management in commercial banks in Nigeria. The specific objectives 
include:  
To ascertain if there is any significant relationship between earnings management and insiders’ ownership. 
To find out if there is any significant relationship between earnings management and external block-holders. 
To determine if there is any significant relationship between earnings management and institutional investors. 
 
2.0 Literature review and hypotheses statement  
2.1 Concept of earnings management  
Earnings management is recognized as attempts by management to influence or manipulate reported earnings by 
using specific accounting methods or accelerating expense or revenue transactions, or using other methods 
designed to influence short-term earnings. The term as generally understood refers to 
systematic misrepresentation of the true income and assets of corporations or other organizations (Beneish, 2001). 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) states that earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting in structuring transactions to alter financial reports, to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting". Growing evidence from prior research supports the argument that earnings management is a 
common practice in firms (see Dye 1988; Trueman and Titman 1988; Scott 1998).  Bakre, (2007) Ajibolade 
(2008) and Okike (2009) Otusanya and Lauwo (2010) have cited evidences of earnings management in the 
Nigerian banking sector. Given that managers have flexibility in choosing accounting policies, they choose 
policies that maximize their own utility. Several studies on earnings management take this opportunistic 
perspective ( Cahan 1992; Sweeney 1994).  
2.2 Ownership Structure and Earnings Management  
Ownership structure as proposed by the agency theory is one of the most important corporate governance 
mechanisms to solve agency problems and suggests that concentrated ownership will result in more effective 
monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Whilst researchers in developed countries focus on the conflict of 
interest among outside shareholders and managers in a diffused ownership, in Asia where ownership 
concentration structures are more common, the agency problem shifts to conflicts amongst the controlling 
owners and the minority shareholders (Claessens & Fan, 2002). The concentrated ownership creates agency 
conflicts between controlling owners and minority shareholders, which are hard to mitigate during the traditional 
functions of a board of directors. It is argued that an effective mechanism to constrain earnings management is 
the development of an appropriate ownership structure. It has also been stated that, where there is a separation of 
ownership from the control of a business, there is a tendency for managers of companies to engage in fraudulent 
financial reporting in order to maximize their own personal welfare to the detriment of the interests of the users 
of financial statements, the investing public and bank depositors (Sikka, 2009; Dabor and Adeyemi, 2009). Two 
schools of thought exist regarding an effective structure of ownership. First, insiders or managers of the firm act 
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also as shareholders if they acquire a considerable portion of the entity’s shares, and this is deemed to be useful 
in reducing agency conflicts and aligning the interests of management and shareholders. Secondly, outsiders who 
own a significant number of the firm’s shares, have more power and more incentive to monitor management 
activity, mainly the process of financial reporting, thus reducing the earnings management probability. The 
following firm ownership structures will be examined and will form the basis for the specification of the 
hypotheses. They include; managerial ownership, institutional ownership and external block-holders.  
2.3 Insider / Managerial Ownership 
Koh (2003) investigated Australian firms in relation to the relationship between managerial ownership and 
aggressive earnings management practice and found a positive association between them. This result is 
consistent with the view that high managerial ownership encourages managerial accruals discretion. Hsu and 
Koh (2005) extended Koh’s (2003) research by investigating the effect of both short-term and long-term 
managerial ownership on the extent of earnings management in Australia. They found that managerial ownership 
is statistically significant for all linear specifications but insignificant for the non-linear models. However, 
managerial ownership is positively associated with income-decreasing discretionary accruals and negatively 
associated with income-increasing accruals. Teshima and Shuto (2008) examined the managerial ownership 
effect on earnings management and found that earnings management is significantly positive within intermediate 
regions of ownership, which suggested that the entrenchment effect is dominant in these regions. Chung, R., 
Firth, M., & Kim, J. B. (2002) studied this relationship by hypothesizing that the constraining relationship 
between earnings management, on the one hand, and an independent board of directors and the audit committee 
existence, on the other hand, will be more pronounced when the level of managerial share ownership is low. 
They did not document a direct association between managerial ownership and earnings management. On the 
other hand, they found little support for these conjectures, suggesting that boards continue to have a constraining 
influence on earnings management, even when shareholders’ and managers’ interests are better aligned.  
2.4 Institutional Ownership  
Previous literature illustrates that institutional investors can be considered as sophisticated investors who 
typically serve a monitoring role in reducing pressures for myopic behaviour. For instance, Bushee (1998) 
investigated as to whether institutional investors create or reduce incentives for corporate managers to reduce 
investment in research and development (R&D) to meet short-term earnings goals. The results indicated that 
managers were less likely to cut R&D to reverse earning decline when institutional ownership is high. It is a 
global view that institutional investor involvement in corporate governance is complementary to corporate 
governance mechanism. Latest studies use the level of institutional ownership and average percent of 
outstanding shares that are owned by institutional investors (Koh, 2003).  
2.5 Block-holders’ Ownership     
Block-holders’ ownership takes various forms including individual investors, pension funds, mutual funds, 
corporations, private equity firms, fund managers, banks and trusts. Zhong, K., Donald, W. and Zheng, X. (2007) 
considered two competing views when studying the relationship between block-holders and earnings 
management. First, consistent with the agency theory perspective, small block-holders can sell their stocks 
quickly if they are not pleased with the performance of managers, whereas large block-holders found it hard to 
sell a large block of stock without it having considerable impact on the firm, including lowering its stock price. 
Thus, large block-holders normally adopt a long-term strategy and thus they need to monitor managers to 
produce more benefits for their equity ownership. Secondly, unlike small shareholders, large block-holders can 
put pressure on managers to report a favourable financial performance and create another threat of intervention 
to perceived underperforming management (Barclay & Holderness, 1991; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Consequently, the existence of large block-holders may press firms' managers to engage in income-increasing 
earnings management to report a favourable financial performance.  
 
HYPOTHESES STATEMENTS 
The following hypotheses formulated for the study will thus be tested. They are as follows; 
There is no significant relationship between Insider Ownership (INSIDEROWN) and   Earnings Management.  
There is no significant relationship between relationship between External block ownership (EXTBLH) and 
Earnings Management. 
There is no significant relationship between Institutional Investors Ownership (INSTIIOWN) and Earnings 
Management.   
 
3.0 Methodology and model specification  
The study adopts a pooled series research design which includes both cross-sectional and time-series data 
properties with an extensive reliance on secondary data from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) statistical 
bulletin and the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) information on annual reports of quoted companies for the 
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period 2006-2010.  A sample size of 10 companies of the twenty –four (24) listed banks as at 2010 was selected 
using the simple random sampling technique. Krejcie & Morgan (1970) in Amadi (2005) agree with the sample 
as they proposed the population proportion of 0.05 as adequate to provide the maximum sample size required for 
generalization. Additionally, banks with insufficient data for ownership and those with inadequate financial data 
are excluded from the sample. Multiple regression analysis will be utilized as the data analysis method. The 
regression analysis will be carried out using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation technique. The choice 
of this technique is predicated on the fact that the sample estimates obtained using the technique represent the 
Best (minimum variance), Linear, Unbiased Estimate of the population parameters.   We examine whether 
each of the ownership structure categories (management, external block-holders, and institutional investors) is 
associated with earnings management. From the hypotheses the following models are specified. 
EMit = α1 + α2 INSIit + α3 EBHit +α4 INSTit + εit ---------- (1) 
Where,  
EMit is earnings management measured by discretionary accruals for firm i at time t, INSIit is insiders 
(managerial) ownership variable, INSTit is institutional ownership variable for firm i at time t, and EBHit is 
external block-holders' ownership variable for firm i and time t, and εit is the error term. 
3.1 Variable definition and measurement 
Measuring Earnings Management 
In this study, we use accounting accruals approach to measure earnings management. Accruals include a wide 
range of earnings management techniques available to managers when preparing financial statement such as, 
inter alia, accounting policy choices, and accounting estimates (Grace et al., 2005; and Fields et al., 2001) 
Discretionary accruals are extensively used to demonstrate that managers transfer their accounting earnings from 
one period to another. In other words, managers exercise their discretion over an opportunity set of accrual 
choices within GAAP, Following recent literature (see Jaggi and Leung 2007), this study uses the cross sectional 
variation of the modified Jones model Jones, (1991); and Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G. and Sweeney, A. P. 
(1995) to obtain a proxy for discretionary accruals. Total accruals (TACC) is defined in this study as the 
difference between net income before extraordinary items (NI) and cash flow from operating activities (OCF):- 
TACC = NI – OCF............................................................................................................................................ (1) 
The equation below is estimated for each firm and fiscal year combination 
TACCit/Ait-1 =αt [1/Ait-1] +α1[∆REVit−∆RECit/Ait-1] +α2i[PPEit/Ait-1] +εit …………………………………….. (2) 
Where, TACC is the total accrual,  
∆REV is the change in operating revenues,  
∆REC is the change in net receivables,  
PPE is gross property, plant and equipment, t and t-1 are time subscripts and i is the firm subscript.  
Non-discretionary earnings (NDE) are earnings less discretionary accruals (DACC). To estimate the coefficient 
values, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is employed. The Difference between total accruals and the 
non-discretionary components of accruals is considered as discretionary accruals (DACC) as stated below: 
DACC=TACCit/Ait-1-[α
^
t(1/Ait-1)]+α
^
1[(∆REVit−∆RECit)/Ait-1]+α
^
2i[PPEit/Ait-1] ...............................................(3) 
All variables are scaled by prior year total assets At-1 . 
3.2 Measuring Ownership Structure 
Insider ownership (INSI), external block-holders ownership (EBH) and institutional ownership (INST) were 
collected from the annual reports of the sampled firms in the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) data base. INSI 
was defined as the percentage of shares held by officers or directors within the bank. EBH was measured as the 
percentage of shares held by the individual block-holders. For each party, we only consider the ownership 
percentage that represents 5% or more of bank's equity share capital. INST was measured as the percentage of 
shares held by institutions, which includes shares owned through social security and other funds. Consistent with 
Koh (2003), the following organizations are classified as institutional investors: insurance companies (life and 
non-life), pension funds, investment companies, and financial institutions including banks 
 
4.0 Presentation and analysis of result  
The normality and descriptive statistics test, the variance inflation factor result,, the regression result, the 
Breusch-Godfrey correlation LM,  and white Heteroskedasticity Test,  were all employed in the study.  This 
section comprises of the presentation and analysis of result and the hypotheses testing.  
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Table 1    Descriptive statistics 
 EARNMGT 
 
EXTBLH 
(share units in 
millions) 
INSIDEROWN 
(share units in millions) 
INSTIINV 
(share units in millions) 
 Mean 28.59 2.56 22.56 7.77 
 Maximum 47.38 4.00 56.58 18.519 
 Minimum 16.721 1.86 16.55 2.809. 
 Std. Dev. 3.129 0.133 7.92 1.301 
 Jarque-Bera 137.38 72.01 201.5 189.613 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Sum 5821.640 28255.96 3.61E+09 2.96E+08 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 448812.5 111.7064 1.19E+17 1.76E+15 
 
Table 1 above displays the descriptive statistics for the data. As observed, the value of Total Earnings 
Management measured using discretionary accruals for the sampled banks for 2005-2010 has a mean value of 
28.56 and standard deviation of 3.129. The maximum and minimum amounts for the study period were 47.38 
and 16.721 respectively.  The Jarque-Bera statistic value of 137.38 and p-value of 0.00 confirms the normality 
of the data and suitability for generalization. It also indicates the absence of outliers in the data. Ownership by 
External block holders (EXTBLH) stood at a mean value of 2.56m share units for the period under review while 
the standard deviation stood at 0.133. The maximum and minimum value of Ownership by External block 
holders (EXTBLH) for the period under review as seen in table 1 is 4.00m and 1.86m respectively.  The 
Jarque-Bera statistic value of 72.01 and p-value of 0.00 also confirms the normality of the data and suitability for 
generalization. It also indicates the absence of outliers in the data. Furthermore the mean share units representing 
the extent of Insider Ownership (INSIDEROWN) for the sampled banks for the study period stood at 22.56m 
share units while the standard deviation is 7.92. The maximum and minimum unit for the study period is 56.58m 
and 16.55m respectively.  The Jarque-Bera statistic value of 210.5 and p-value of 0.00 also confirms the 
normality of the data and suitability for generalization. It also indicates the absence of outliers in the data.  
Finally, mean share units representing the extent of Institutional Investors Ownership (INSTIIOWN) for the 
sampled banks for the period under review stood at 7.77m share units with a standard deviation value of 1.301. 
The maximum and minimum share units for the study period were 18.519 and 2.809 respectively.  Like in the 
others, the Jarque-Bera statistic value of 189.6 and p-value of 0.00 also indicates that the data are normal and 
there are no outliers in the data. 
Table 2       Variance Inflation Factors 
 Coefficient Centered 
Variable Variance VIF 
C  16.09477  NA 
EXTBLH  0.000227  1.700859 
INSIDEROWN  2.88E-14  2.301144 
INSTIINV  1.29E-12  1.522571 
      
Table 2 shows the variance inflation factor (VIFs) which measures the level of collinearity between the possible 
regressors in an equation. The VIFs show how much of the variance of a coefficient estimate of a regressor has 
been inflated due to collinearity with the other regressors. They can be calculated by simply dividing the 
variance of a coefficient estimate by the variance of that coefficient had other regressors not been included in the 
equation. . The VIFs are inversely related to the tolerances with larger values indicating involvement in more 
severe relationships. Basically, VIFs above 10 are seen as a cause of concern (Landau and Everitt, 2003). Thus 
with centered  VIF values of 1.700 for External block ownership (EXTBLH), 2.03 for Insider Ownership 
(INSIDEROWN) and 1.522 for Institutional Investors Ownership (INSTIIOWN) respectively, there is  no 
evidence of multicollinearity and hence the variables are suitable for regression analysis which is carried out and 
presented below. 
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Table 3 Regression Result 
Dependent Variable: EARNMGT 
Method: Least Squares 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 7.945144 4.011829 1.980429 0.0494 
EXTBLH 0.107247 0.015061 7.121000 0.0000 
INSIDEROWN 4.20E-07 1.70E-07 2.473299 0.0145 
INSTIINV 1.94E-08 1.13E-06 0.017111 0.9864 
R-squared 0.481905     Mean dependent var 36.38525 
Adjusted R-squared 0.471942     S.D. dependent var 53.12928 
S.E. of regression 38.60777     Akaike info criterion 10.16947 
Sum squared resid 232527.4     Schwarz criterion 10.24635 
Log likelihood -809.5573     F-statistic 48.36775 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.698012     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Source: eviews 7.0 
 
Table 3 presents the regression result with earnings management as the dependent variable computed using the 
Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model while the explanatory variables are External block ownership 
(EXTBLH), Insider Ownership (INSIDEROWN) and Institutional Investors Ownership (INSTIIOWN) 
respectively.  From the table, it is observed that the coefficient of determination for the regression as depicted 
by the R
2
 value of 0.48 suggests that about 48% of the systematic variation of the dependent variable is 
accounted for by the explanatory variables. The adjusted R
2
 also shows a value of 0.47.  The analysis of the 
slope coefficients of the explanatory variables indicative of the direction of relationship and their respective 
t-values or p-values indicative of their statistical significance reveal the existence of a positive relationship 
between External block ownership (EXTBLH) and Earnings Management as shown by the slope coefficient of 
0.107. The relationship is observed to be statistically significant at 5% level with a p-value of 0.00 which is less 
than the critical p-value of 0.05. The relationship between Insider Ownership (INSIDEROWN) and Earnings 
Management was also observed to be positive and statistically significant at 5% significant level as indicated by 
the slope coefficient of 4.20E-07 and p-value of 0.01 which is less than the critical p-value of 0.05. A positive 
relationship was also observed between Institutional Investors Ownership (INSTIIOWN) and Earnings 
Management as depicted by the slope coefficient of 1.94E-08. However, the relationship is statistically 
insignificance at 5% level given its p-value of 0.98 which exceeds the critical p-value of 0.05.   The f-statistic 
of 48.36 and with a p-value of 0.000 suggests that the variables considered jointly are all significant determinants 
of Earnings Management. The Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.7 which examines the presence of serial between in 
the error term do not provide evidence of stochastic dependence between successive units of the error term. The 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation Lm Test presented below also confirms the absence of serial correlation in 
the error term. 
 
Table 4       Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation Lm Test:  
F-statistic 2.11394     Probability 0.1008 
Obs*R-squared 6.36802     Probability 0.0957 
Source: eviews 7.0  
 
The Breusch-Godfrey correlation LM test for the presence of autocorrelation reveals that the p-value of the 
f-statistics and the observed R-squared is 0.10 and 0.09 respectively using a residual lag length of 3. When 
compared to the critical value of 0.05, the p-values are noticed to be higher and this shows the non-existence of 
autocorrelation. Hence the estimates of the regression follow the non-violation of the zero covariance assumption 
of the ordinary least squares. 
 
Table 5   White heteroskedasticity test: 
F-statistic 0.837131     Probability 0.543011 
Obs*R-squared 5.085633     Probability 0.532878 
  Source: eviews 7.0  
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The table reveals that the p-value s for both the f-statistics and the observed R- squared stood at 0.54 and 0.53 
respectively using residual lag length of 2. The values are greater than the critical value of 0.05 at 5% 
significance level. This shows that there is no evidence for the presence of heteroskedasticity since the p-values 
of the f-statistic, observed R-squared and the scaled explained sum of squares are considerably in excess of 0.05.  
 
Table 6 RAMSEY RESET TEST: 
F-statistic 0.037147     Probability 0.847418 
Log likelihood ratio 0.038341     Probability 0.844760 
Source: eviews 7.0  
 
The Ramsey Reset Test shows that the p-values for the t-statistic and f-statistic of 0.844 and 0.847 respectively 
are greater than the critical value of 0.05. This shows that there is no apparent non-linearity in the regression 
equation and it would be concluded that the linear model is appropriate 
HYPOTHESES TESTING 
The following hypotheses formulated for the study will thus be tested. They are as follows; 
H0: There is no significant relationship between Insider Ownership (INSIDEROWN) and Earnings Management.  
 From the analysis of the regression result in table 3, a positive relationship exists between Insider Ownership 
(INSIDEROWN) and Earnings Management.  Consequently, the null hypothesis (H0) of no significant 
relationship between Insider Ownership (INSIDEROWN) and Earnings Management is rejected. 
H0: There is no significant relationship between External block ownership (EXTBLH) and Earnings 
Management. 
From the analysis of the regression result in table 3, a positive relationship was observed to exist between 
External block ownership (EXTBLH) and Earnings Management. Consequently, the null hypothesis (H0) of no 
significant relationship between External block ownership (EXTBLH) and Earnings Management is rejected. 
H0: There is no significant relationship between Institutional Investors Ownership (INSTIIOWN) and Earnings 
Management.  The result in table 3, shows a positive relationship between Institutional Investors Ownership 
(INSTIIOWN) and Earnings Management. Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) of no significant relationship 
between Institutional Investors Ownership (INSTIIOWN) and Earnings Management is accepted.  
 
5.0 Discussion of findings 
From the findings of the study a positive and significant relationship was observed to exist between External 
block ownership (EXTBLH) and Earnings Management as shown by the slope coefficient of 0.107 with a 
p-value of 0.00.  The finding suggests that increase in External block ownership may create a situation of an 
increase in management’s disposition to earnings management in the Nigerian banking sector.  The study’s 
finding is in tandem with the findings of McEachern (1975), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988), and Barclay and Holderness (1991). However, our finding is in contrast with that of Dechow et 
al. (1996),  Yeo, G., Tan, P. and Chen, S.  (2002).  
The relationship between Insider Ownership (INSIDEROWN) and Earnings Management was also 
observed to be positive and statistically significant at 5% significance level as indicated by the slope coefficient 
of 4.20E-07 and p-value of 0.01 which is less than the critical p-value of 0.05. The study’s finding in this regard 
suggests that Insider Ownership may not after all provide the adequate monitoring needed to make management 
averse towards the proclivity for earnings management in the banking sector in Nigeria.  The study’s finding is 
in line with that of Sanchez-Ballesta and Garsa-Meca (2007); Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny (1998) ; 
Gabrielsen, G., Gramlich, J. and Plenborg, T.(2002). However, it contrast with the findings of Warfield, T., 
Wild, J. and Kenneth, W. (1995) and Dempsey, S., Hunt III, H. And Schroeder, N. (1993)  
A positive relationship was also observed between Institutional Investors Ownership (INSTIIOWN) and 
Earnings Management as depicted by the slope coefficient of1.94E-08. However, the relationship is statistically 
insignificance at 5% level given its p-value of 0.98 which exceeds the critical p-value of 0.05. The implication 
therefore is that institutional investor ownership as a proportion of total ownership may not signal a decline in 
the opportunistic demeanour of management which serves as a breeding ground for earnings management. The 
finding of this study is in tandem with those of Porter (1992), Bushee, (1998) and Grace, H. and Koh, P. (2005). 
This does not  agree with works El-Gazzar, 1998; Wahal and McConnell, 2000; Velury and Jenkins, 2006.  
5.1 Conclusion and recommendation  
The study examined the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management in Nigeria.  Using 
regression analysis, a series of diagnostic tests and disaggregating the firm ownership structure. The three 
variables tested; External block ownership (EXTBLH), Insider Ownership (INSIDEROWN), Institutional 
Investors Ownership (INSTIIOWN) has a positive and significant relationship with Earnings Management. The 
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recommendation of the study is that there is the need to ensure that effective corporate governance is in existence 
and identify the salient channels that may send directly or indirectly the signals of a tensed financial environment 
that could predispose managers to engage in earnings management.  As a suggestion for further study, finding 
suggests the need to investigate the board room dynamics as the ownership structure examined in isolation may 
not provide a satisfying explanation to the underlying issues of earnings management. In our opinion, this may 
be a reason for the clear polarity in empirical findings as firm specific effects could interface with ownership 
structure.  It is suggested that interactive effects and relationships between ownership structures and for 
example CEO duality, Audit firm effects and the managerial incentive structure of the firm be examined.   
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REGRESSION RESULT 
 
Dependent Variable: EARNMGT   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 06/04/12   Time: 02:15   
Sample: 1998 2007   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 16   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 7.945144 4.011829 1.980429 0.0494 
EXTBLH 0.107247 0.015061 7.121000 0.0000 
INSIDEROWN 4.20E-07 1.70E-07 2.473299 0.0145 
INSTIINV 1.94E-08 1.13E-06 0.017111 0.9864 
     
R-squared 0.481905    Mean dependent var 36.38525 
Adjusted R-squared 0.471942    S.D. dependent var 53.12928 
S.E. of regression 38.60777    Akaike info criterion 10.16947 
Sum squared resid 232527.4    Schwarz criterion 10.24635 
Log likelihood -809.5573    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.20068 
F-statistic 48.36775    Durbin-Watson stat 1.181714 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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DISCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Date: 06/04/12   
Time: 02:13     
Sample: 1998 2007    
     
      EARNMGT EXTBLH INSIDEROWN INSTIINV 
     
      Mean  28.59  2.56  22.56  7.77 
 Maximum  47.38  4.00  56.58 18.519 
 Minimum  16.721  1.86  16.55 2.809. 
 Std. Dev.  3.129 0.133  7.92  1.301 
 Skewness  2.08  1.715  2.18  3.93 
 Kurtosis  6.98  4.716  8.32  25.84 
     
 Jarque-Bera  137.38  72.01  201.5  189..613 
 Probability  0.000  0.000  0.0000  0.0000 
     
 Sum  5821.640  28255.96  3.61E+09  2.96E+08 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  448812.5  11177064  1.19E+17  1.76E+15 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 2.416021    Probability 0.1008 
Obs*R-squared 4.867574    Probability 0.0957 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/04/12   Time: 02:59   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.700825 4.049099 0.173082 0.8628 
EXTBLH -0.001346 0.015011 -0.089656 0.9287 
INSIDEROWN -4.23E-09 1.69E-07 -0.025098 0.9800 
INSTIINV -2.01E-07 1.13E-06 -0.177561 0.8593 
RESID(-1) 0.168906 0.082264 2.053207 0.0417 
RESID(-2) -0.081667 0.081625 -1.000520 0.3186 
     
     R-squared 0.030422    Mean dependent var -2.16E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001057    S.D. dependent var 38.24181 
S.E. of regression 38.26203    Akaike info criterion 10.16357 
Sum squared resid 225453.4    Schwarz criterion 10.27889 
Log likelihood -807.0857    F-statistic 0.966408 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.013288    Prob(F-statistic) 0.440287 
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White Heteroskedasticity Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.837131    Probability 0.543011 
Obs*R-squared 5.085633    Probability 0.532878 
     
     Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/04/12   Time: 03:00   
Sample: 1 160    
Included observations: 160   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1313.635 783.0792 1.677525 0.0955 
EXTBLH -2.048517 7.968523 -0.257076 0.7975 
EXTBLH^2 0.008086 0.009308 0.868708 0.3864 
INSIDEROWN -9.42E-06 5.97E-05 -0.157772 0.8748 
INSIDEROWN^2 -2.35E-14 4.84E-13 -0.048451 0.9614 
INSTIINV -7.08E-05 0.000361 -0.195951 0.8449 
INSTIINV^2 3.97E-12 1.64E-11 0.241490 0.8095 
     
     R-squared 0.031785    Mean dependent var 1453.296 
Adjusted R-squared -0.006184    S.D. dependent var 6040.883 
S.E. of regression 6059.533    Akaike info criterion 20.29942 
Sum squared resid 5.62E+09    Schwarz criterion 20.43396 
Log likelihood -1616.953    F-statistic 0.837131 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.046880    Prob(F-statistic) 0.543011 
Ramsey RESET Test:   
     
     F-statistic 0.037147    Probability 0.847418 
Log likelihood ratio 0.038341    Probability 0.844760 
     
          
est Equation:    
Dependent Variable: EARNMGT   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/04/12   Time: 03:00   
Sample: 1 160    
Included observations: 160   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
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C 7.450968 4.771667 1.561502 0.1204 
EXTBLH 0.112934 0.033149 3.406902 0.0008 
INSIDEROWN 4.53E-07 2.44E-07 1.859773 0.0648 
INSTIINV -7.76E-08 1.24E-06 -0.062350 0.9504 
FITTED^2 -0.000407 0.002111 -0.192737 0.8474 
     
     R-squared 0.482029    Mean dependent var 36.38525 
Adjusted R-squared 0.468662    S.D. dependent var 53.12928 
S.E. of regression 38.72747    Akaike info criterion 10.18173 
Sum squared resid 232471.7    Schwarz criterion 10.27783 
Log likelihood -809.5381    F-statistic 36.06120 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.698703    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     
Variance Inflation Factors  
Date: 06/04/12   Time: 03:14  
Sample: 1 160   
Included observations: 160  
    
     Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
    
    C  16.09477  1.727648  NA 
EXTBLH  0.000227  2.460206  1.700859 
INSIDEROWN  2.88E-14  3.872942  2.301144 
INSTIINV  1.29E-12  1.996443  1.522571 
    
        
 
 
  
